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Abstract: The occurrence of genocide during war is a serious security predicament facing 
humanity in modern times, producing civilian casualties measured in millions. The persistence 
of this heinous crime renders imperative understanding of the effects of genocide in the course 
of war and its aftermath, effects that this paper examines in the context of the Srebrenica 
genocide of July 1995 – the darkest moment in European history since the Holocaust. The 
analysis is grounded on a critical examination of the concept of genocide and its close 
connection with war. It shows that relations of power are central to the happening of genocide 
and the ways of dealing with it in the post-conflict setting. When embedded on asymmetrical 
relations of power, war can be conducive to genocide because it creates organizational, 
political, and psychological conditions that facilitate large scale killing of targeted people. 
Whilst in the course of war genocide benefits the perpetrators, in the aftermath of fighting 
genocide can lend credence to the victims’ community demands for recognition, accountability 
and redress. At the same time, the perpetrators and their community – frequently – deny 
genocide with the view to avoiding responsibility and reparations. The instrumental utility of 
genocide reflects rationales that go at the heart of enhancement of national identity and 
(contested) claims for political authority and legitimacy. More than twenty years after the 
Srebrenica genocide, these competitive and divisive claims do not bode well for Bosnia’s 
societal cohesion and transition to sustainable peace. 
 
Introduction 
Genocide—the worst crime known to mankind—hurts humanity by very large scale casualties, 
frequently incurred in times of war.1 The coupling of genocide with war constitutes a serious 
security predicament in modern times, exemplified by the cases of World War II (WWII) which 
enabled the Nazi genocide of approximately six million Jews—the Holocaust, and the 1994 
civil war in Rwanda which enabled the genocide of eight hundred thousand Tutsis—killed at a 
rate three times faster than that of the Jews during the Holocaust.2 Another example pertains to 
the 1992-95 Bosnian War which led to approximately one hundred thousand people dead and 
over two million displaced, including the worst massacre in the European history since 
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WWII—the Srebrenica genocide of July 1995 where more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims were 
killed in just one week.3 In recent years, the genocidal attacks of ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fil 
'Irāq wa ash-Shām (known as the so-called ‘Islamic State’) against Yazidi civilians in Iraq and 
Syria have  taken genocide at a distinct level associated with the political aims—and capacity—
of a violent non-state actor, a capacity frequently thought to belong only to states.4 Given the 
recurrence of this crime, understanding the effects of genocide in the course of war, and its 
aftermath, is an imperative.  
 
This paper assesses the role of genocide both in the course of war and its aftermath in the 
context of the Srebrenica genocide (July 11-19, 1995) grounding the analysis on a wide range 
of interdisciplinary sources from conflict and peace studies, politics, sociology, and law. In 
over two decades since the ending of the war, the people of Srebrenica—and of Bosnia—have 
lived with the impact of that fateful event. Their rather common sentiment of ‘unsettled scores’, 
the idea that the war is not over yet, reflects discontent with the post-war setting. Hence the 
present participle ‘ending’ in the title of this contribution suggests some continuity from war 
to the present fragile peace, and implies discontent that is mediated—amongst other factors—
by (divergent) interpretations of genocide. 
 
This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between genocide, war, 
and peace. It shows how interpretations of genocide—including its meaning—affect 
formulations of both war and peace. In Bosnia’s setting, the paper demonstrates that the 
Srebrenica genocide has been a factor both in the ending of war and the constitution of inter-
ethnic relations in the ensuing peace. The analysis proceeds as follows: the first section 
explores the etymology of genocide and its correlations with war. Following an overview of 
the place of Srebrenica in the Bosnian War, the analysis then subjects to critical scrutiny the 
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centrality of Srebrenica to the genocide debate and its effects on the constitution of knowledge 
about war atrocities. The penultimate section sheds light on the impact of genocide on national 
identity. It spells out, on the one hand, the utility of genocide commemorations for the 
enhancement of the community of victims’ national identity and their demands for moral 
authority and redress. On the other hand, it shows that the denial of genocide by the community 
of perpetrators challenges survivors’ claims and their political agendas. The conclusion draws 
these strands together and points out that inter-ethnic tensions bode ill for Bosnia’s social 
cohesion. In particular, contentious interpretations—and denial—of the Srebrenica genocide 
hold the present hostage to a disputed past and constitute a stumbling block to transition of the 
country to a durable peace.  
 
Genocide, war and its aftermath 
The term ‘genocide’ was first coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish jurist, as a combination of 
the Greek word ‘genos’ which means ‘race’ and the Latin word ‘cide’ which means ‘to kill’ in 
his 1944 book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe—one of the first detailed documented accounts 
of war crimes perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jews and other groups in the course of 
WWII. He realized that these crimes were so heinous that exceeded criminal offences framed 
in existing international law, which assumed that war was fought between states rather than 
states against a section of their own people, as was the case of Germany which, guided by Nazi 
ideology, was waging war to destroy civilian populations, primarily the Jewish nation. For 
Lemkin, therefore, ‘genocide’ was an extreme form of violence waged by a state with the 
purpose of national extermination. 5  This work laid the ground for the first formal, legal 
definition of genocide, which was codified in 1948 in the United Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (known as the UN Genocide Convention) which 
entered into force in 1951. According to Article II of this Convention, genocide refers to  
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acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.6 
 
Despite being criticized especially on sociological grounds—particularly for emphasizing 
intent—the definition of genocide provided in the UN Genocide Convention remains the most 
widely accepted definition of the term in academia and the courts of law—including the 
International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. In fact, 
critics acknowledge that it is to the Convention that most scholars refer in identifying genocide. 
 
Clearly, the targets of genocide are civilians, non-combatants. Two legal components of 
genocide demand attention, namely, the material element constituted by one or several of the 
genocidal acts enumerated in the definition, known in legal parlance as actus reus, and the 
mental factor known in juridical terminology as mens rea, which consists of the special intent 
(or dolus specialis) to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, or religious group, as 
such.7 This special intent (dolus specialis) of the perpetrators to destroy a group in whole or in 
part sets genocide apart from any other crime, including, for instance, ‘ethnic cleansing’ despite 
frequently interchangeable use of the two terms. The primary difference between ‘genocide’ 
and ‘ethnic cleansing’ pertains to intent. Whilst in genocide the intent of the perpetrators is to 
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exterminate the targeted group, the intent of ethnic cleansers has frequently been to remove 
and expropriate the targeted people.8  
 
Both the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the United 
Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—established by the 
UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994 respectively to investigate and prosecute the 
perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—have held that the crime 
of genocide does not necessarily imply the actual extermination of the targeted group in its 
entirety.9 The phrase ‘in whole or in part’ was understood by both Tribunals to mean the 
destruction of a significant portion of the group from either a quantitative or a qualitative 
standpoint.10 Subsequently, genocidal intent may be manifested in two ways: it may consist of 
desiring the extermination of a large majority of the targeted group, in which case it would 
constitute an intention to destroy the group en masse; or it may consist of the destruction of a 
more limited number of persons, such as the leadership of the group, or male members, chosen 
by the perpetrators for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival of the 
group as such.11 The ICTY has maintained that the geographical zone in which an attempt to 
eliminate a group is made may be limited in size.12    
 
This, nevertheless, raises a question about the quantification of the targeted ‘group’: what size 
should the targeted ‘group’ have for the crime to classify as genocide? Can it be the population 
of a district, a city, or a town? As it will be shown in the third section below, several cases 
decided by the ICTY have answered the latter question in the affirmative. This in itself might 
not be unproblematic, however, because it perpetuates discrepancies between a non-restrictive 
(expansivist) meaning of genocide and a more restricted one that is prescribed in the Genocide 
Convention. Should one decide to atomize the ‘group’ to the level of the town or village, one 
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might run the risk of opting for numerous genocides, which could be of a much smaller scale 
compared to the Holocaust and Tutsi genocides, the archetype cases of genocide compatible 
with the definition of the term provided in the Convention. In addition, should one atomize the 
‘group’ as stated above, one is likely to be faced with a number of violent conflicts which in 
their totality may not qualify as genocide and yet could contain in themselves one or more of 
the constitutive ingredients of the actus reus of genocide cases as appears to be the case of the 
Bosnian War (1992-1995). In the context of the latter it has not been proven that the Serb 
leaders and their military echelons had the intent to commit genocide against the whole 
community of Bosnian Muslims—known also as Bosniaks—in the whole of Bosnia. However, 
should one focus at particular villages or towns then the constitutive ingredients of the crime 
of genocide can be less challenging to demonstrate. This is the case of Srebrenica where 
between July 11 and 19, 1995 some 25,000 Bosnian Muslims, were expelled and at least 7,661 
Bosniak boys and man of military age were killed.13 
 
Considerations regarding the size of the group targeted by the genocidaires ought not to be 
taken lightly. Such group has significant ramifications for interpretation of genocide and 
rationales thereof. Indeed, the size of the targeted group is central to what can be termed as a 
strict interpretation of genocide, whereby only the largest and severest cases of atrocity are 
termed genocide as opposed to a non-restrictive interpretation of genocide whereby small 
groups may be taken to be subjected to genocide. The French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, 
in his stark reflection on the history of humanism, has suggested that only three genocides have 
befallen humanity in the course of the twentieth century, namely the Armenian genocide, the 
Holocaust, and the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda. 14  There are moral reasons for 
acknowledging a hierarchy of crimes where genocide stands at thepinnacle, and therefore for 
questioning an expansive definition of genocide whereby the size of the targeted group could 
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be atomized at the level of town and village. Two main reasons come to mind: first, the 
archetype cases of genocide would be depreciated, and second, reconciliation in the post-
conflict setting would be rendered more difficult by terming, or inflating, so many massacres 
as genocide, i.e., the worst crime known to humankind.15 In fact, the drafters of the Genocide 
Convention had opted for a strict construing of the term ‘genocide’. They were concerned that 
unless strictly construed ‘the idea of genocide [could] be expanded indefinitely to include the 
laws of war, protection of minorities or respect for human rights’ thus depreciating its stigma 
which ought to be assigned to the ‘most heinous crimes of intentional group destruction’. 16 
This conforms with the idea that in the pantheon of evil, genocide evokes greater condemnation 
than do other offences such as crimes against humanity or war crimes.17  Scholarly and legal 
opinion remains divided nonetheless on the interpretation of the size of the group with both 
strict and expansive interpretations—as defined above—being offered by scholars and legal 
experts.18 
 
Although the question of the terminology is not entirely resolved, there is wide consensus on 
the close connection of genocide with war.19 In the strict definition of genocide, virtually all 
cases have occurred during war. The connection of genocide with war is frequently mediated 
by the state, in the sense that most modern acts of genocide have been highly organized, 
officially sanctioned campaigns—directed at defenceless and unresisting civilians—in the 
midst of an intra- or inter- state war.20 Indeed, the main perpetrator of genocide has been almost 
always a state, genocide being a negative expression of state power and a display of state 
monopoly of power. A state-sanctioned affair in the midst of fighting, genocide has relied on 
war in many ways. In all examples mentioned above, war has offered social, political, strategic 
and psychological conditions conducive to genocidal killing. War can also play a role in 
masking genocidal activities and attribution of deaths by the perpetrators to ‘casualties of 
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war’.21 War creates organizational, political, and psychological conditions that facilitate the 
outbreak of genocide. Whilst war increases vulnerability of civilians, especially of the targeted 
groups, in war times government power becomes more centralized, using censorship and 
propaganda to increase support for its belligerent policies. 22 Genocidal governments have 
consistently utilized military force for the purposes of perpetrating genocide.23  
 
Moreover, those engaging in genocide use ideology—nationalist, racial, or religious—to define 
people targeted for purging and elimination. Like war, genocide may be justified by a fear of a 
threat connected with the targeted people, which might be illusionary or real. Victims are 
dehumanized and perceived as lying outside the moral obligations of the perpetrators. They are 
frequently portrayed as subhuman and evil, and thereby—from the perpetrators’ point of 
view—deserving death.24 Getting rid of the adversary has not necessarily been simply an end 
in itself, but rather a means to an end. Genocide, therefore, can be seen as a state’s political and 
military instrument to achieve an end—frequently conceived to maximize the efficiency of a 
conquest. Indeed, in the course of war, including the Bosnian War of 1992-95, the motivation 
of the genocidaires have been at least twofold: to accomplish war aims of acquiring territory 
cleansed of undesired peoples and simultaneously improve the chances of negotiating a 
favourable peace; and enhance solidarity and unity amongst the community of the 
perpetrators.25 Hence, in the course of war, genocide seeks to serve what perpetrators perceive 
to be an intended function of security—although the actual effects of genocide can differ from 
intended ones.26  
 
Effects of genocide on societies do not cease when a peace deal is reached to end the fighting. 
The purposeful use of genocide continues in the post-war era as a fragile peace takes hold, 
frequently coupled with (new) expressions of nationalist ideology and new forms of identity 
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politics. Whilst in the course of war, genocide is intended to benefit the perpetrators, in the 
aftermath of war, genocide can lend credence to the victims’ community demands for 
recognition, accountability, and redress. Yet, frequently, denial of genocide assists the 
perpetrators’ community to avoid responsibility and reparations. These differing usages of 
genocide on the side of the community of victims and that of perpetrators undermine societal 
cohesion and prospects of sustainable peace. Moreover, the instrumental uses of genocide in 
the post-conflict setting reflect rationales that go at the heart of (contested) claims for political 
authority and legitimacy, a point that will be explored below in the Srebrenica’s setting.  
 
Place of Srebrenica in the Bosnian War 
The place of Srebrenica in the Bosnian War is such that it is not really possible to think of one 
without the other. As Mark Danner has observed: just like ‘the world is contained in a grain of 
sand, so the war in Bosnia is contained—in the barbarity and the disinclination of the “civilized 
world” to stop it—in the massacre at Srebrenica’. 27  In the international perception, the 
interrelation between the Srebrenica genocide and the Bosnian War may have been cemented 
on those faithful days (11-19) of July 1995, but such intertwining on the ground certainly 
preceded those dates. The complex causes of the Bosnian War have been examined in many 
studies and will not be revisited here due to lack of space.28 The purpose of this section is to 
emphasize how the Srebrenica genocide manifested a key feature of the Bosnian War, namely 
the policy of ethnic cleansing in its most severe expression, and how Srebrenica embodied the 
flawed international response to this war in the form of the so-called ‘safe areas’ and ultimately 
the failure of peace-keeping, which in the face of genocide induced a more decisive response 
from the international community that became crucial both to the conclusion of the genocide 
and the war.    
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Srebrenica has been repeatedly subjected to ethnic cleansing during the war prior to the fateful 
month of July 1995. In many ways, Srebrenica epitomizes the main criminal feature of the 
Bosnian War, especially related to the first year of fighting (1992-1993) during which most 
non-Serbs were forced out of Serb-controlled territory, and majority of killings, rapes, tortures, 
etc., occurred.29 The most tragic, and prolonged armed conflict on European soil since WWII, 
the Bosnian War was characterized from the outset by a policy of ethnic cleansing centered on 
forceful expulsion of targeted communities as a means of controlling territory and resources 
by the perpetrators and their ethnic kin. 30 A town in Eastern Bosnia—a region bordering 
Serbia—Srebrenica was geo-strategically important for establishing territorial continuity 
between holdings of the Bosnian Serb Army in eastern Bosnia and Serbia proper. According 
to the ICTY as early as mid-May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs 
had adopted the goal of eliminating the Drina River as a border separating eastern Bosnia from 
Serbia by establishing a foothold in the Drina River valley.31 Occupied by the Serbian forces 
in April 1992, the majority Muslim population of Srebrenica was expelled in the course of this 
takeover. In May that year, the Bosniak forces managed to take control of the town, turning it 
into a base for Muslims expelled from their homes elsewhere in Eastern Bosnia, and also for 
Bosniak fighters who aimed to join Srebrenica with other small enclaves with substantial 
Muslim population.32 The crowded town’s population lived in calamitous conditions, at times 
relying on Bosniak raids in neighbouring Serb villages which occasionally led to Serb 
casualties.33 The ICTY sources show that in November 1992, the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) 
devised a military strategy—inscribed in Directive 4—to force the Bosnian Muslim population 
to leave the wider Srebrenica area. After several months of intense combat, the VRS launched 
a major offensive at the end of March and beginning of April 1993 which resulted in the 
expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from Vlasenica and Bratunac municipalities to Srebrenica. 34 
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Serb forces threatened to retake the latter, but a change of tack of the UN peacekeeping in the 
country postponed the Serb retake.35  
 
This change of tack pertains to the ‘safe areas’ policy which constitutes the second aspect that 
renders Srebrenica central to the Bosnian War. On April 16, 1993, UN Security Council 
Resolution 819 declared Srebrenica a ‘safe area’ a pioneering model which provided for 
protection of the town by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Resolution 
inscribed that: ‘all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe 
area that should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act’.36 The ‘safe area’ model 
was then expanded to other cities and towns—Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Žepa, and Goražde—
and appeared, initially at least, to be central to UNPROFOR’s mission in Bosnia. Nonetheless, 
the hope that ‘safe areas’ would provide protection of civilian population was short lived. 
Indeed, no viable protection could be offered by lightly armed, small UNPROFOR units with 
no mandate to enforce peace. Protection of ‘safe areas’ was a job for combat-capable, peace-
enforcement operations, but the UN troops on the ground were given only a peacekeeping 
mandate—a strategic incompatibility, since there was no peace to keep and civilians were 
increasingly the targets of violence. Srebrenica, therefore, exposed the flaws of the ‘safe areas’ 
policy, and the lack of international commitment to defend them.  
 
Furthermore, Srebrenica was central to the Bosnian War in terms of the escalation of the war 
and simultaneously by giving expression to the failure of the peacekeeping mission in the 
country. In spring 1995, the Serbian leadership undertook to change its military strategy and 
escalate fighting. This followed the (re)establishment of the Croat Bosniak alliance (brokered 
by the United States), a gradual lifting of the UN arms embargo (an embargo that reinforced 
Serb military superiority), and tightening of economic sanctions against Serbia and Republika 
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Srpska.37 Part of the Serbian plan related to physical separation of Srebrenica and Žepa—
inscribed in the strictly confidential ‘Directive for Further Operations No. 7’ (‘Directive 7’ 
issued on March 8, 1995)—with the view of creating a situation of complete insecurity that 
would undermine prospects of civilians’ self-defence and survival. 38  This, in turn, would 
prepare the ground for the takeover of Srebrenica, and ultimately create favourable conditions 
for a peace agreement on Serbian terms. The Serbian offensive on the UN ‘safe area’ of 
Srebrenica commenced on July 6, 1995 without being confronted by the Dutch peacekeepers 
(Dutchbat) stationed in the enclave. UNPROFOR’s vulnerability was made crystal clear in 
May that year, when 347 Dutch peacekeepers were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb Army 
(VRS), as a consequence of which UNPROFOR prioritized its own security rather than that of 
the civilian population it was supposed to protect.39 In one of the most detailed judgements 
delivered by the ICTY, the Trial Chamber in Prosecution vs. Radovan Karadžić (2016) showed 
that as Srebrenica fell, a group of Serb leaders—including Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, 
Ljubiša Beara, and Vujadin Popović—formed and executed a plan to eliminate the Bosnian 
Muslims of Srebrenica by forcibly removing the women, children and elderly men. In the night 
of July 11 and the morning of July 12, this plan expanded to encompass the killing of the able-
bodied men and boys.40  In the ensuing days—July 12-19—at least 7,661 Bosniak men and 
boys were killed and tens of thousands of civilians, mostly women and children, were expelled 
to central Bosnia in a systematic and accelerated campaign of ethnic cleansing that now is 
widely recognized to meet the constitutive elements of the actus reus of genocide.41 
 
This darkest moment of the Bosnian War represents a monumental failure of peacekeeping. 
Members of the Dutchbat themselves ‘facilitated the crimes in the enclave’,42 helping Serbian 
troops to separate men and boys, on one side, from the female and elderly population, on the 
other, and expelling the latter. 43  The fall of Srebrenica—in the presence of the UN 
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peacekeeping troops—and the massive loss of civilian life brought genocide back to Europe 
after some fifty years since the Holocaust. In marking the failure of the aspiration ‘Never 
Again’ the Srebrenica genocide meant a serious loss of prestige for the United Nations and was 
one significant factor that stirred the international community into a more decisive action to 
end violence. This constitutes another aspect in which Srebrenica is central to the Bosnian War. 
The fall of the enclave and the failure of the UN to protect its civilian population was a 
culmination of a pattern of tepid international response to the war marked by reluctance of the 
Great Powers to intervene. But just few days after the fall of Srebrenica, the United States made 
the robust decision to use force to end the Bosnian War.44 Thus, the Srebrenica genocide was 
a crucial turning point that led to ‘the ending’ of the Bosnian War. The ensuing NATO’s air 
strikes were a factor to bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, resulting in the 
General Framework Agreement (GFA—known also as the Dayton Agreement) worked out in 
Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, which officially ended the war. The Dayton Agreement—
whose negotiators included some organisers and perpetrators of ethnic cleansing—provided 
for two distinct entities within Bosnia, namely the Muslim-Croat Federation holding 51 percent 
of Bosnia’s territory and Republika Srpska holding the remaining 49 percent. An inter-entity 
boundary line (IEBL) confirmed a de facto partition of the country. The GFA was construed in 
an ambivalent fashion; whereas it provided that the displaced people had the right to freely 
return to their homes of origin (‘domicile return’) it also conformed to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention in adhering to the principle of non-refoulement, that is, the GFA provided also for 
the right of refugees not to return but to resettle in a place of their choice. As some distinguished 
scholars of Bosnia have noted, the GFA was a poor basis for establishing a suitable modern 
state because it created a state that was defined in terms of the people who created the war and 
sanctioned and/or perpetrated ethnic cleansing.45 
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Srebrenica and the genocide debate 
Srebrenica is also central to an important and ongoing debate on genocide, both as it pertains 
to this particular case and also as it relates to the genocide phenomenon in general. The use of 
the term ‘Srebrenica genocide’ ultimately suggests implicit assumptions about what this 
genocide is and what effects it has. Whilst the first section shed light on the legalistic 
interpretation of the term ‘genocide’, this section brings into focus some legal and political 
repercussions of the process of representation of Srebrenica as a case of genocide.  
 
The inception of the genocide debate in the context of the Bosnian War can be traced in March 
1993 when, faced with the international community’s reluctance to intervene and end the 
fighting, the government of the newly recognized Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed in 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) a case against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (then 
comprising Serbia and Montenegro). In this unprecedented case, the Sarajevo government 
asserted that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was responsible for violating the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.46 This was as much a legal case 
as a political and social one, in so far as the Bosnian government sought to bring the suffering 
of its people to the attention of the world’s leaders and persuade the international community 
to intervene to stop maltreatment of civilians and induce the Serbian forces to cease their 
aggression in Bosnia. The proceedings of this case, however, run through severe delays due to 
the Bosnian government’s limited resources, and Belgrade’s fierce opposition to the case. The 
ICJ case was eventually decided after thirteen long years, in February 2007, a decision which 
is referred to below.47 
 
Legal battles over war crimes committed in the course of the Bosnian War—including 
genocide—continued in numerous cases considered by the ICTY in The Hague. A number of 
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these cases related directly to Srebrenica including the proceedings against Radovan Karadžić 
and Radko Mladić, and cases of Radislav Krstić, Vujadin Popović et. al., and Zdravko 
Tolimir.48 Of these, the Krstić case (2001)49 is of particular significance because it established 
beyond reasonable doubt that genocide was committed in Srebrenica. Working with the legal 
definition provided in the UN Genocide Convention that considers intent of the perpetrators 
and scale as key, distinguishing elements of genocide, the Krstić judgement ascertained that 
the destruction of such a large number of Srebrenica men would ‘inevitably result in the 
physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica’.50 Until this time, this 
was the first and only case in which the ICTY confirmed that genocide was perpetrated by the 
Serb troops against Bosniaks of Srebrenica. It took the ICTY fourteen more years to deliver 
the first full genocide judgement in 2015.51 So far only five indictees have been sentenced on 
genocide charges.52  
 
The limited convictions notwithstanding, classification of events at Srebrenica in July 1995 as 
genocide carries huge significance for Bosniak victims’ families and their wider community in 
terms of recognizing the extraordinary nature of their suffering and concomitantly victims’ 
efforts for redress. Such classification, nonetheless, has not gone unchallenged by legal experts, 
although the criminality of actions of Bosnian Serbs forces is undisputed. William Schabas—
a professor of international law—has argued that although the atrocities at Srebrenica ‘surely 
qualify’ as crimes against humanity, ‘categorizing them as “genocide” seems to distort the 
definition unreasonably’.53 Prosecutor’s contention that the intent in killing the men and boys 
of military age was to eliminate the community as a whole was accepted by the Trial 
Chamber.54 However, Schabas suggests that this conclusion was a rather ‘enormous deduction’ 
and contends that the group ‘could have been targeted precisely because they were of military 
age and thus were actual or potential combatants’.55  
 
 
16 
 
 
Despite these contestations, the classification of Srebrenica as genocide, received new boost 
with the 2007 decision of the ICJ on the case concerning the Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that the Bosnian government initiated 
against Serbia in 1993. Relying on ICTY material, the ICJ reached the conclusion that the 
Srebrenica massacre of July 1995 was an act of genocide under international law. In addition, 
the 2007 ICJ judgement confirmed the large extent to which Belgrade had supported Serb 
forces in Bosnia (by providing military, political, and financial aid) and the strong influence it 
had upon Bosnian Serb leaders, acts which, in effect, rendered Serbia an accomplice in the 
Bosnian War.56 The 2007 ICJ judgement did find Serbia guilty for not preventing genocide, 
not punishing genocide and not cooperating with the ICTY. 57  However, the judgement 
restricted Serbia’s culpability in that it found that the Belgrade government possessed no 
special intent to commit genocide in Bosnia.58 This restriction of Serbia’s culpability not only 
disappointed survivors and some analysts, but it also exposed discrepancy regarding legal 
consistency of the ICJ reasoning. The ICTY, on whose work the ICJ relied, inferred genocidal 
intent from factual, circumstantial evidence. Yet although establishing the large extent of 
Belgrade support for Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade’s strong influence on their ethnic kin in 
Bosnia, the ICJ did not infer that Belgrade was an accomplice in the Srebrenica genocide or 
had the intent to commit genocide—showing that the ICJ adopted a strict, conservative 
interpretation of the term. 59  The space available here does not allow for engaging more 
elaborately with the elements of the ICJ 2007 judgement and ICTY judgements related to 
Srebrenica. Overall, assessments of these judgements contain both criticism and appraisal.60 
Nevertheless, in the context of this paper, it is worth noting three aspects of this legal work 
with reference to construction of knowledge about the occurrence of genocide and what 
responses such mass killing may (fail to) entail.  
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First, these judgements have contributed to establish beyond reasonable doubt a detailed factual 
record of the Srebrenica genocide, and other atrocities related to cases evaluated therein. The 
ICTY—and ICJ 2007—judgements narrate the evil which gripped Srebrenica and Bosnia in 
the course of war: crimes committed, criminals involved, extent of planning, and details of 
execution of such plans. These judgements influence the understanding and interpretation of 
events at Srebrenica in particular and the Bosnian War in general as well as their implications 
for the post-conflict era (in terms of a hierarchy of crimes, suffering, and redress). Therefore, 
the corpus of judicial pronouncements produced as a result of criminal trials related to 
Srebrenica and elsewhere in the course of the Bosnian War have contributed to construction of 
social knowledge about the Srebrenica genocide and other serious violations of human rights 
during the war.61 This work has also provided one particular frame within which the memories 
of genocide and war have been shaped and articulated. 
 
Second, by singling out only crimes in Srebrenica in July 1995 as a case of genocide in the 
broader setting of the Bosnian War, the legal body of work produced by the ICTY and ICJ have 
actually atomized the concept of genocide in the sense that they have inferred that a wider 
conflict may not be considered genocide, yet a mass atrocity in its midst may be qualified as 
such.62 In the opinion of this writer, such atomization has not added clarity to the definitional 
debate pertaining to genocide. Indeed, this atomization is of some concern to those who 
adhere—strictly—to the letter of the Genocide Convention because judicial interpretations of 
the ICTY and the ICJ 2007 judgements have made genocide applicable to situations that differ 
from the prototype of systematized and massive group destruction, such as for instance the 
Holocaust that initiated the concept of genocide in the first place.63  
 
 
 
18 
 
Third, the extraordinary nature of genocide is closely connected not only with the high degree 
of severity of crimes committed under the umbrella of genocide, but also with the political 
nature of the offence and also the political response inscribed in the Genocide Convention. 
Indeed, codified in the Convention is the duty to ‘prevent and to punish’ genocide. 64  A 
genocide occurring in times of war as well as peace requires intervention—a realistic prospect 
when political will and the national interest of Great Powers allow. Nonetheless, this is not 
universally the case as Rwanda (1993), Darfur (2000s) and ongoing carnage in the Syrian War 
attest. 65  Hence, the Srebrenica judgments whilst penalising ex post facto the offence of 
genocide have also exposed an ongoing reluctance of the international community to discharge 
the duty of intervention to stop that extraordinary offence, a duty implied in the Genocide 
Convention.  
 
Politics of national identity: Utility of genocide and its denial 
For the people of Bosnia the significance of genocide is not constrained solely to legalistic 
criteria and court cases pertaining to the massacre of July 1995. Indeed, genocide has become 
an intrinsic part of who Bosniaks are; the genocide informs ways of thinking both about the 
past and the present, and conditions how Bosniaks relate to the international community and 
their former opponents—Serbia and the Serbs. Ever since the occurrence of the genocide, 
victims have demanded recognition of their ordeal. They have engaged in acts of 
commemorations—most prominently those at the Memorial and Cemetery Centre at Potočari, 
the Peace March (Marš Mira), and mass burials acts that exert public recognition of war and 
suffering, and enhance collective memory and national identity.66 
 
The significance of commemorations and collective memoralization can be construed not only 
as a psychological need—an expression of morning, a human response to death and suffering 
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on a very large scale—but also as profoundly political. The political aspect of commemorations 
lies in the fact that they are a crucial element in the symbolic repertoire available to the national 
elites for binding citizens into a collective national identity. 67  Numerous works have 
emphasized the power of commemorations to draw upon the sacrifice and loss occasioned by 
war and genocide as a means of shaping national identity and preserving, reinforcing, or 
challenging dominant elites and ideologies within a given state. 68 Suffering incurred in the 
course of war and genocide can be central to the identity and symbolic continuity of a nation. 
As Anderson has stipulated, a nation ensures its symbolic continuity by construing its members 
as forming an imagined community that surpasses death, whereby the living generations feel  
their connection with the dead co-patriots thus securing the nation’s imagined continuity and 
transcendence of time.69 Memory of persecution and suffering has become a crucial marker of 
the Bosnian heritage. One of the most significant attributes of the Srebrenica genocide—
perhaps its greatest political utility—has been the enhancement of Bosnian national identity, 
that is, enhancement of the national identity of Bosnian republic inhabitants who adhere to the 
idea of Bosnian statehood.  
 
Srebrenica is central to commemorations both at home and abroad. For instance, in May 2007 
the High Representative for the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina—Mr Christian Schwartz-Schilling—urged the United Nations to establish the 
UN Day of Srebrenica to pay respect to genocide victims and families.70 In the United States, 
resolutions have been passed—at the federal, state, and city government levels—that have 
remembered the victims of Srebrenica and have condemned the massacre as a case of 
genocide. 71  On January 15, 2009, the European Parliament declared July 11 Srebrenica 
Genocide Commemoration Day and other parliaments in Europe followed suit. 72  These 
commemorations at the international level—grounded on principles of international human 
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rights law—complement those at the national level. Jointly, they represent a dominant frame 
within which the Srebrenica genocide is understood and its memory is articulated.  
 
The legacy of suffering has become a core component of national identity, and claims for 
entitlements and redress. Srebrenica’s Bosnian population has developed its own criteria of 
suffering and entitlement that have been tied to humanitarian aid and social welfare. Bosnians 
judge each other according to implicit criteria about who is most deserving of aid. This criterion 
is based on who has lost and suffered most. There is a distinction, for instance, between those 
who fled in the spring of 1992—before the violence engulfed the city—and the 365 residents 
who remained in the enclave and suffered throughout the war including the Srebrenica 
massacre in July 1995.73 A further distinction exists in terms of loss of family members, as the 
most implicit measure of entitlement and suffering. Sarah Wagner has noted that although 
survivors did not openly compare their losses, there is an unspoken ‘hierarchy of sufferers’ in 
which special status is reserved for those who suffered most.74 
 
The memory of Srebrenica genocide, therefore, has become part of Bosnia’s social structures 
in the sense that it permeates social practices of status and entitlements. This memory is also 
socially framed: it is mediated by Bosnian elites and their vested interests. The framing of 
Srebrenica is conditioned not only by the tragedy and suffering incurred in the past but also by 
current internal power relations and political circumstances of the present. As the former High 
Representative for the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina—
Christian Schwartz-Schilling—has asserted, Bosnian politicians have used the Srebrenica 
tragedy to advance their political agendas.75 
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The political use of genocide is not an exclusive domain of Bosnian Muslim politicians. Serbian 
nationalists—both in Bosnia and Serbia—have not failed to capitalize on the utility of 
genocide’s denial and forgetting. Genocide denial is still common among the Serbs. Testimony 
of this is the memorial that Serbs have erected near Potočari—a sign of antagonistic struggle 
over competitive memory and victimhood. Moreover, Serb leaders refuse to label killing at 
Srebrenica as genocide. Just three days after taking office (May 2012), the current Serb 
President—Mr Tomislav Nikolić—rushed to declare that no genocide took place in Srebrenica 
in contradistinction to the findings of the ICTY and ICJ judgements.76 In April 2013 President 
Nikolić apologized on behalf of Serbia in relation to Srebrenica but avoided referring to the 
massacre as genocide.77   
 
At one level, the Serbian denial is grounded on a relation with the past, that is, refusal to 
acknowledge the gravity of July 1995 crimes for what they were and for what they represent 
in line with international law canon. This denial not only devalues claims to truth championed 
by genocide’s survivors but also erodes social knowledge about the past which is produced by 
the finding of the legal judgements. At another level, genocide denial is grounded on a 
relationship with the present. The Serbian elite in Belgrade realize that acknowledging that 
Srebrenica massacre of July 1995 constitute genocide renders them liable for huge sums of 
reparations. In addition, accepting the blame for Serbia’s involvement in Srebrenica—and in 
the Bosnian War, generally—subverts the Belgrade sponsored narrative according to which the 
war was portrayed as a civil one and grounded on a false reciprocity of victimhood according 
to which all parties were viewed as equally victims.78 This rhetoric (of false reciprocity of 
victimhood) persists despite the fact that the total number of Serb civilian casualties in the 
course of the four year Bosnian War approximates only the number of Bosniaks killed by 
Serbian forces in Srebrenica in one month alone. 79  Furthermore, in the post-war setting 
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domestic stakeholders in Serbia have used the Srebrenica discourse in order to define their own 
political profile for domestic political competition and also discredit political rivals—with the 
progressivist parties arguing that Serbia needs to strengthen her international position and build 
its credibility in Europe and nationalists accusing progressivists of ‘selling the country out to 
Europe’.80  
 
Similarly, for Serbian politicians in Bosnia contestation of the war and events at Srebrenica 
reflect not only a response to the past, but also a particular standing towards the present. The 
current Republika Srpska (RS) President—Mr Milorad Dodik—continues to insist that no 
genocide occurred at Srebrenica. 81 Genocide denial goes at the heart of (challenging) the 
construction of the political community in the aftermath of war, because it undermines—even 
denies—survivors’ requests for return to their former homes, rebuild their livelihood and 
opportunities for employment. Although the UNHCR announced in September 2004 that one 
million persons had returned home in Bosnia, the reality of those returns is a largely sobering 
one. By 2004 the peak years for returns had passed, and the one million figure included only 
40 percent of the 1.2 million refugees who left the territory of Bosnia during the war. The other 
720,000 Bosnians remained outside the country. Furthermore, 56 percent of returns were 
majority returns. In most places the number of minority returns is well below 20 percent.82 In 
particular, genocide denial for the Serbian elite of the Republika Srpska is self-serving; it is 
conducive to a new political reality where Bosniaks have been permanently ethnically cleansed.  
 
Divisive and ethno-nationalist rhetoric has been a constant feature of the political discourse on 
Srebrenica in particular, and Bosnia in general. Radical rhetoric has poisoned the political 
environment. In particular, the conflict over the genocide terminology has been an element of 
a broader struggle over national identity mediated by competing representations of the use of 
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armed force in the course of war. For the Serbs, denial of genocide is part of a struggle to render 
their meaning of violence dominant (at least within their community) in order to secure 
legitimacy for their own use of force in Srebrenica, and in the course of the Bosnian War 
generally, and acceptance of a new political and social reality in RS where Bosniaks have been 
uprooted permanently. For the Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, the genocide debate is an 
avenue for rendering illegitimate Serbian violence in Srebrenica, because genocide can never 
be justified neither on moral nor on legal grounds. At the centre of naming the Srebrenica 
massacre as genocide or otherwise are attempts to use alternative frames for assigning 
significance to the conflict grounded on competing constructions of meaning, that in turn 
provide the basis for the contestation of the use of armed force, memories of genocide, and the 
post-war construction of the political community.   
  
Concluding remarks 
This paper has contributed towards a deeper understanding of correlations between genocide, 
war, and peace. It has scrutinized the meaning of the Srebrenica genocide and offered an 
appreciation of the long shadow it continues to cast more than twenty years after its occurrence 
and the ending of the Bosnian War. The analysis has suggested that relations of power have 
been central to the happening of Srebrenica as much as they remain central to ways of dealing 
with the tragedy in the post-conflict setting. War in itself, under whose mantle genocide occurs, 
embodies (asymmetrical) relations of power that enable genocidal killing. Whilst war and 
genocide are not synonymous, war has been conducive to genocide because it creates 
organizational, political, and psychological conditions that facilitate large scale killing of 
targeted people. The occurrence of the Srebrenica genocide in the midst of the Bosnian War 
reflects a historical pattern of the coupling of genocide with war that constitutes a serious 
security predicament for the international community.  
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Central to the Bosnian War in a number of ways, the Srebrenica genocide became also its 
turning point. Faced with genocide on European soil some fifty years after the Holocaust, the 
international community resolved to end the war after three years of fighting and hold 
accountable some of the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
committed in the course of fighting. The large legal body of work produced by the ICTY in 
relation to crimes committed in Srebrenica on July 11-19, 1995 has provided the ground for 
deep debates on the meaning of genocide and interpretations of its constitutive elements. Yet, 
the ICTY case law has not offered a clear answer on the interpretation of intent and the size of 
the group targeted for destruction. Moreover, some critics are discontented that Srebrenica has 
been decontextualized from the rest of the Bosnian War, and that the concept of genocide has 
been atomized in the sense that only one mass atrocity in the midst of the Bosnian War—
amongst too many similar such cases—has been classified as genocide. This 
decontextualization and atomization of genocide remain a source of contention amongst 
analysts and disappointment for the community of victims. 
 
At the national level, the genocide discourse has been characterized by divisive ethno-
nationalist rhetoric strongly informed by the political agendas of Bosnian and Serb elites as 
they vie for alternative interpretations of the use of violence in the course of war and the 
legitimacy of their post-war policies. The genocide discourse is profoundly political. Not only 
does it provide elites with a symbolic repertoire for binding citizens into a collective national 
community but it also underpins competing social practices of status and entitlements, as well 
as claims to political control. Central to defining the Srebrenica massacre as genocide or 
otherwise are attempts to utilize competing frames of meaning that contest narratives of war, 
memories of genocide, and post-war construction of the political community. 
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After more than twenty years since the ending of the war, Srebrenica continues to be an 
unfolding story of denial of genocide by the Serb establishment and memoralization of the 
tragedy by the Bosnian Muslims as new revelations about mass killing still emerge from court 
proceedings and newly discovered mass graves. The effects of competing narratives of events 
at Srebrenica in July 1995 on the side of the Bosnians and the Serbs have been the lingering 
distrust and resentment between these communities and their leaders. In turn, distrust and 
discontent undermine prospects that a shared historical record of events be accepted in the 
country as a whole, and that a forward-looking dialogue between ethnic communities takes 
hold. This legacy of the genocide undermines Bosnia’s social cohesion and remains an 
impediment to the consolidation of peace.  
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